

Crises

US sudden, unforeseen pull-out ^{VN} world
have effect of producing Skybolt-type,
(Fait accompli) crises for govs that
have backed US policies, in:

Laos

Thailand

Philippines

Japan

Korea

Australia

quite apart from "domino" effect of NVN threat.
Threat from domestic non-Cong opposition.

Oct?
Nov '64

Thunderer notes

Rating

SEA

Chico-Split

Yugoslavia, Russia

Differences for SU:

1. Capital/military vs. consumer
2. Secret police
3. Liberalism; arts

4.

Cyprus

Congo

A

Northoff

Actions

1. Pres speeches
2. RSY answers to queries
3. Rel. readiness

SU

Possible defectors; encourage? (embassies)

Reaffirm commitments (e.g. test ban)

Increase surveillance, SI (analysis of SI)

Increase flow of info.

Possibilities:

a) We will not know motives, all personnel.

b) Ave

c) Reaction in satellites; they may seize moment
to revolt.

d) Revolts inside Russia.

e) S-8 responses to

(343)
Cont'd
U-2

c.g. Cuba

f) Chinese responses to Sov moves

g) French-British moves; German.

h) SURPRISE (Why? Signif?)



W can offer: trade

Gartloff: 1) Internal, domestic factors probably dominate
(We don't know of major conflict on foreign; K had
good luck on China-SV dispute.)

2) If K was pushing strongly a radical
change in direction of increased consumer goods, etc.,
others might have opposed.

3) B-K leadership is what we would have
expected if K had died

Burstall - DE

In my and Skjelvold
- we are ~~in~~ ^{not} in contact

See Allison: My paper on reactions of countries
to being bombed

Precise uncertainty as to B's responses to
your (A) initiatives

- Because of response to "political
considerations"
- Because there are too many conflicts,
uncertainties, changes, subjective aspects

- Effects of hair on JFK style, performance?
- Aronson guesses on LBJ?
- Much of amateurism in bureaucracy + politics; not knowing who to persuade, and how; disdain for power as persuader, compared to intellectual argument.

Berlin

Collo. account strange: crisis disappears, without S asking the question, "Why?" What were U's motives, in retrospect? How serious? (How much were Soviets doing, besides stating intent; what signals). A part of Adelphi program? Berlin TF planning; Berlin Game.

Above all, no mention (like Sos) of end of missile gap (or of earlier exchange at Vienna on balance); diplomatic speech.

SU expectations on Wall: Why did they think they could get away with it? Did W/H really take a "grim view" at the time? Promotion of legal implications, costs, of Noll.

1967
22 March, 2200

Dear Frank,

Certain choices have been

Powers: Shadow + Substance. Greatest realists have
been those who place great importance on shadow/mage/will/
and who see ^{importance of} measures to preserve/build or use "substance".
in terms of effect on self (rather than ignoring developments
that don't change substance, or that improve substance in worsening self)

Novel: ^{even Dulles} ~~Dulles~~ Action, ^{even Dulles} Body: early JFK; she is relying

on (recent) substance + allowing self to dwindle; Moneymaker.

Look at system: close up, + detail; at process; is intercept with good access; ...

(1) How badly system worked: Missile Gap (though despite "good war"
the msses got won
brilliant resolution); Laos; Cuba; SVN; NATO;
missile crisis (very mixture); low testing; Wall; France; Hyatt
(later: Bonn Rep., Kourou, ^{Cognac} SVN; turned in China;
Exceptions: Berlin; Test Ban; missile crisis itself)

(Intel failures; yet CIA looks no worse than other cognitive functions in gov) (better, in SVN)

Domestically: better on Civil Rights, Economics

But cities; Negro problem; crime

Need to improve the ~~existing~~ environment: incidence of crisis
US now preoccupied by crisis/surprise/threatening
initiatives, just as SVN preoccupied by urban
riots (or US budget scandal by SVN)
Calculate costs, in attention and time + staff
effort, of clear mistakes by us or avoidable miscalculations
by others, in terms of effort toward long-run problems,
new initiatives.] (like McN's problem with Congress, our
B-70: response to Viet-Sun struggle). (④ risks of blow-up
(or V-T-Ble War))
JFK initial concern with "miscalculation":

Note how may actually occurred (miscalc. of his own
reaction: Berlin, Steel, Cuban missiles, Bay-Pearl raid; Hyatt miscalculated
the oil economy well;

29 March 1967

Dear President,

Theses to comment on from Sorenson/Schlesinger:

1) CIA in Bay of Pigs ^{+ Laos} and SVN = Indonesia ⁵³²

(CIA shortcomings; Phillips thesis)

Hilfstein speech

2) Berlin crisis — puzzle of resolution; what it led to.

3) Missile gap ending + effects (Vienna, Berlin, Hilfstein,...
⁴⁹⁹
Civil Defense)

4) Shadow + substance of power; Bay of Pigs; Wiesbaden; Berlin;
^{482; 483}

Cuba (Tunis). Concern for "stabilization."

5) Steel crisis — Missile crisis

"(Cooper Commission is
closing out a crisis: Review)

6) Missile crisis: — Secrecy

- role of committee

- to what; expectations (election)

- Shootdowns + ultimatum; Cuban control

- Turkish IRBM accident

DDO

7) Untold: change of war plans; Ann Arbor; helping French; NATO imposed
⁵⁰¹ JFK attitudes on traps in the
Pres C+C MLC folly

8) SVN: motive for commitment

(breaks binding ties, Cuba, Berlin,
SVN, Cuba — Wiesbaden, finally SVN)

9) European doubts in JFK (like SD):
- in nucleus,

demonstration of the cost of
pursuing "prestige" — when
bluff is called.

10) Art. of war without: infiltration

Review

Crisis

Hyp: I perception of a very ambiguous situation
as unambiguous, calls for strong, risky,
irreversible action, suggests either

(1) desire/need to perceive it that way

[or, to perceive it as unambiguous?]

and/or (2) desire/need — proceeds for other, of
complex, or unconscious reasons — to take

→ that action

[or, "some strong action"?]

E.g. (1) Interpretation of Sow motions in Cold War

(e.g. in USSR) (or, w.r.t. Germany)

(2) Barber/mirror gaps

(3) ABM gap

(4) Second Jordan Self incident.

(5) Interf. of Chilean miners?

Crisis

What happens to proposals for:

(1) threats, to preclude actions?

[(2) before Hiroshima

(3) before bombing of NVA

(4) before Diem coup

[But: Cuba II]

What happens to proposals to negotiate

(5) After At onset of bombing NVA.

What if: Pluth had not come, during Kosygin visit - and

- (a) SU had made clear its intent to support but (b) Lek proposal tempting negot plan, espnow

Did UK take the attack deliberately?

(Or, to coincide with NCG visit?)

Why Pluth?

What was Kosygin reaction? How was
SU policy affected?

Why Pinochet?

Did we foresee UK support? lack of pressure for
negot? (Arnold Wilson, Times)

Crisis

Westy saw VN as a slow crisis from 1964
on:
- US troops were required to save VN
- VN must be saved
- It would take time to bring in US troops
must start as soon as possible

(NVA troops would have been perfect excuse; but
^{Westy!}
we didn't know of these soon enough.)

(Westy wasn't looking for excuse tho.)

Westy was betrayed by his J-2 : reflexes
from Harkins' era!)

It had to wait to (small) Com successors of spring '68
and ride on the committee ruined by the bombing.

Wolfe: Is this a success or a failure for
US

"Plan for a change"

"He lost China!"

Sovn: Series of mistakes lost his ability to build support, protect his power.

Precipitating incident: speech on reallocation.

Sovn: maybe they didn't want to give him chance to consolidate his position on celebration of economist

Timing: His rises have come when he was out of
town: 1957, last April, Yugoslavia, Togas.

Others: the "wrong" approach



Dans.

But doesn't that we should speculate

(How will Soviets react to Chinese nuclear explosion?

Sovs: They may accept Chinese bid to a summit on
disarmament. -

Does

(Continuation of

Cuban crisis

Correspondence

4.

1. Did B + K have access to letters?

Thompson: Dob had said they hadn't³; only K, Memphis,

- - -

(others: can't believe that. T: can't assume they didn't know.) But they have access now.

T: correspondence has been withheld for some time; no need to reserve before deletion.

T: They straddled the issue of designating vs. following party vs. government: one of each. But this can't go on; either I would put my money on Podgorny to be the new chairman, the only one who is the K type.

To Watch out not to provide incidents, provocations.

Don't go closer than ... 20 miles, etc.

(Pulled chamber back; called off flight. [likely]

Cuban miles? 304?

To They're going to wait for an election in my event.

They will want to keep things on dead center.

To We might nudge them on Indonesia - Malaysia.

To They will also want to wait and see how weak the
British Labor Gov is.

Horlick 800 16 Oct

Nepotism

Cult of personality

Personal diplomacy

Azhubei's visit to Germany

(Will visit to West Germany be
backed up by Kosygin?)

"There are some comrades who say I shouldn't

They have presented K with a fait accompli.
Was meeting a full meeting of the Central
Committee — did they fly in members from all —
give K a show to marshal support

+

Did Ambassadors come in? (They

Prauda est; no policy issues mentioned

Free-wheeling

Law-Council schemes

Not taking into account elements of science +
technology

Nepotism

See article by Talenzy in Int. Affairs #10, 1964
on ABM (Deployment by peace-loving
gov is not destabilizing). Problem for SU.

Tal. has taken L, non-military position

▲ ▲ ▲

Vague commitment to deStabilization

Not until about 1961 that KC was described
as CINC, by Malinovsky; not in Const.

Const: President

Malinovsky now in control of the armed forces than
before; but prob. Brezhnev in charge. Decisions
by majority vote of the Presidium.

Horchick

B Brezhnev senior partner.

Leaders don't want to give all power
to one man; split

[Joint US-Soviet initiative on non-proliferation
Present rules not to assist others] ☐

Howard Sweare, VCCA: book on
The Politics of Succession (in USSR)

(Frost & Seuss months prob. liked by all ~~south~~
East Eur anns except Albania & Yugoslavia.

Nov '64

Aegis Talk

UCCA Talk

1. Role of preconceptions
(prior probs; types...
acts, relevant states, values,
info sources, lot's; prior probs)
Effect on "insight",
reflection

2. Relevance of formal models
of decision; & evidence

1. Tension
2. Presentation: focus: attention
3.

Cuban II Crisis

I did not know:

⑦ Turkish missiles were removed by JFK
and SU was told; but this was in
context of ultimatum!

Moreover, message to NATO not was not
delivered [because of ultimatum? Waiting for
a reply? ask Nitze.] yet decision was
made, all bases were told!

Never, had to follow Khrushchev / Swore Khrushchev
(Emmett Hughes, 2 Oct 67) advice: "Piecemeal
^{Decide who}
not to save us" "Cast doubt on our
(real?) determination to stop Communism; a unilateral
resolution that is real basis not only of faith in
our treaties but in our continued help even without
treaty & i.e. SVN." I.e. Free World relies on
US internal (Resolve) to oppose & stop Communism
everywhere & more than on our Word, & whether or
not Word has really been given.

SVN put in jeopardy worldwide faith in our
"Compulsion to Oppose" Communism, not in credibility
of our Promise to Help an Ally.

"Losing" a country to Communism (and in
this setting, any shift is regarded by others—ad
mitted by them to be regarded by US—as a
US "loss") thus always questions US will & ability;
hence, if a commitment is needed to prevent "loss,"
stand for us to withhold it. We end up pledged
to appear worldwide not only "aggression" but
any shift to or even towards (Dom Rep) Communism
(thus, abstention to elections in SVN; Thailand?)

Crisis & Commitments

[Can't just say, Weakness (less, by of Pigs, Wall I) → impudent commitments (+ enemy boldness) → war/crisis. (SVN; Cuba II). (Munich → Polish monster, Berlin street → War); Withdrawal from Korea → Korea as if Fairness/commitment always led to Peace.

Dulles →
Tough: Cuba II → Peace
Quinn: I + II → Peace]

Costs/picks of commitments Korea → Trincom, SVN (Korea 1967)
Also commitment/toughness can lead to other, less
modest commitment; → eventually to temptation or
frustration of own effort, → war.

1) Need to establish rationale for one
commitment, gain broad support, may make it difficult
to recall other commitments, or to draw back from
modest or rash commitments; or to make desirable
retaliations. And success can lead to over-confidence,
and over-reliance on threat. 2) Commitment by US
leads to make effort by ally look unnecessary or
unimportant (ARVN; NATO allies) → their contribution
(and their security and domestic policies, budget)
→ adding → attorney bigs more & more critically on US
position → great apprehension over any acts that symbolically
or tact on US will i.e.g. fail to make new commitments
that, show distrust to Com. or concern for others... (It's

For the President: the Crisis is the Pay-off

Crisis are the Health of the Presidency

[On: Humiliation and the Web of Crisis

Turpion: Chinese humiliation during 1850-1920 as root of nationalism. (Cf. Black Nationalism) VN.

Framework: Syg, U-2, Cuba I, Cuba II, Laos, Wall

Crisis = public decision-making, with high humiliation-potential. Hence, it is post crisis that form a major context for current/present crisis (in mids of (a) public, and (b) bureaucracy). Crisis is Presidential decision-making; his own performances/etc. are revealed more to bureaucracy — even more than to public — in crisis than usual; ^{with} more public attention. Thus, post crisis-expertitudes/decisions between low court decisions will be interrupted: post crisis supply the hypotheses and prior probs., for drawing inferences (e.g., SEC is a quitter...?)

Crisis are the Test, the Experiment, the Sample-point in observations on the President.

Or: 'people' (public, bureaucracy, allies, enemies) have theories of "Pres/US behavior in crises" (i.e. ally, anti-comm. crises), which they test, apply, modify in new crisis; for this, Crises (or a sub-set) are the sample space: Pres must refer to this space if he is to draw inferences. The Country, the Test, the Pay-off.

Ambidexter : 1) discreditation, another in making
awareness of cost of failure, hard to ~~but~~
commit; 2) moisture/ damage to force Allied
efforts, not except over-reliance on US; 3)
discreditation is breaking, avoiding commits: conscious
of costs - pressures to make new ones elsewhere.

(Avoiding a ^{new} commit - as Bay, Laos - taken
as undermining faith in old commits - Berlin, SVN,
Thailand - requiring other new ones to restore.)

Thay by fall

Failure can lead to avoidance of new
commits (Bay of Pigs - Laos; SVN now → Long
now) (Bay → limits on SVN, fall '61)

By Fall 1961, JFK ~~action~~ was committed -
Prone (esp. in Far East) yet, for SVN and SEA,
Troop-ly. I need to make at least a
symbolic commit - yet skepticism and
reluctance to insert troops.

[Note: case made by Taylor for troops - 1961 - my
like McG. B case for bombing North, in Feb 1965. a little
less urgent, action more radical; yet LBJ took later, JFK
waited longer.]

Crisis

(What makes so many consumers "desperate" to Pres — since multiplies crisis — since distracts attention from other measures, problems and multiplies violent "solutions")?

(a) Domestic political consequences

(b) Allianced politics.

Consider why these: (1) are taken so seriously by Pres

(2) Why the consumers suspend, etc.

(e.g. use of deception, secrecy, "position")

Boston July '65 Contingency Planning

1) A reason for distrust: A plan that is done

- a) quickly, but non-urgently
- b) by low-level staff
- c) long before the event
- d) [on single-agency basis]

is unlikely to correspond to the plan that would emerge close to the event, with:

- a) high-level participation; interagency
- b) urgent focus of attention
- c) current details.

Hence: 1) "wasted" time

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Anti-crisis planning:

① planning, or

② crisis-like activity

to prevent an specific, identifiable

crisis.

(Jordan waters; ?)

Komer: "Systematic [explicit extended form] analysis of the problem almost nil"

"systematic planning of the preventive phase of problems we can all see coming down the pike."

e.g. how to get through the Jordan waters disputes without an Arab-Israel dispute.

Thompson: Study what could have been done to prevent crises, avoid them?

(Skybolt

Holton Crisis

14/18322 and 14/1485 Wash

Oppe (Central comd. in Stanleyville)

to Prabs CINC in Paris:

Have received tel from Bumba. 5 American planes
have bombed. Request you authorize me to kill
all Americans who are in the liberated zone. Anxiously
your answer.

("We got a message we wish we hadn't gotten."

Oct[?] 1964

Braque; Harkiss; Cooper;

Sixty Commandos expected to be stopped
before they started; never imagined they might
be stopped in middle.

(Braque: this Paris/London Books did think
this, after start, though commandos didn't know it.)

Cooper: Strong concern that operation be short
as possible, because of CN reaction.

[Didn't force us pursue?] Big one

Limits of Presidential Power — and Paternal

Show cases where Pres is pressed along
policy lines where he doesn't really believe:

(MLF, conventional strategy; no aid to French; CB)
or bellying; Bay of Pigs) and how this snaps in a crisis,
or summit. (Opponent, knowing Pres may not believe what
he says, "helps" him with fait accompli; or fails to believe.

Or Pres is unable to get what he wants:

the: Korean (China?) Troop reduction

JFK: Judicial Review and (Crisis, and after-Crisis.)

— JFK failure to control the MLF crisis.

[Is the CB offer of a billion dollars to
SRV/NVN ^{after the USP} good if NVN wins?]

Comment: Dm
Note: US response to "request" — that had been
drafted by USG.

[Compare recommendations/measures in Taylor
Report with C/S/Kalptraive.]

How big a charge was received by Washington?
(Clear break of Geneva)
Why negotiate? VC? or internal weaknesses,
requiring succes against VC (letter not negot.
in itself)?

Compare two foreign reports.

Theory of the fait accompli:

To move before : i) Opponent can take positive steps to forestall you
ii) Opponent can commit himself to furnish you.

He may still furnish if he thinks the effect of this on future situations is "worse than trouble." But before you do, he might have committed himself to a promise more for you and more costly for him because

(1) he didn't expect it to be "called"; he hoped to defer; he attached low probability to this possibility.

2) The punishment for ignoring a threat must be greater than (or, in addition to) the punishment intended to deter a specific act in the future. He has invested "face" in the locus of commitment; he must protect its status for all future threat situations.

More first, and you encourage him to making against your move (with "obligations").

c) May even forestall his intent; or, more likely, make it more costly (e.g. make it appear "unattractive") and more time-consuming if opponent had been able to do so.

Final situation in which we can decide that S has caused O 's behaviour.